This paper examines the relationship between liquidity and quality of financial information by analyzing long-term trends in Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure for firms that restate financial statements. I find that for most income decreasing restatements illiquidity increases several months before restatement announcement and remains at elevated levels one year after restatement. The result is most pronounced for firms listed on NASDAQ. Increase in illiquidity is greater upon restatements due to revenue recognition, those prompted by party other than auditor, those made by larger firms with high volatility of returns and low price levels. Income increasing restatements do not affect information asymmetry of the firm. Overall, my results indicate a positive relationship between quality of financial information and liquidity.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the corporate scandals of the Enron era and the recent financial crisis, policy makers and regulators have called for improved quality of financial reporting and greater transparency. However, the evidence regarding the costs and benefits of financial reporting and disclosure remains limited (Leuz and Wysocki (2008) ).
1 The benefit of disclosure best supported by theory is the increase in liquidity of a firm's shares (Verrecchia (2001) ). Liquidity is negatively related to the level of adverse selection in the market, which results from some traders having informational advantage over other traders (Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Kyle (1985) ). If better quality financial information reduces the level of adverse selection in the market, then liquidity will increase.
Empirical literature on the relation between the quality of financial information and liquidity is limited (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) ). Several papers examine the association between liquidity and analyst evaluations of disclosure quality (Welker (1995) , Healy, et al. (1999) and Heflin, et al. (2002) ). 2 They find that better disclosure increases liquidity. For example, Welker (1995) documents that firms in the lowest third of the disclosure rankings have a 50% higher bid-ask spread. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use an event study framework and show that German firms that commit to higher levels of disclosure by switching to International Accounting Standards (IAS) or U.S. GAAP experience a 35% decrease in bid-ask spread and a 50% increase in share turnover. 1 The terms "disclosure", "transparency" and "quality of information" are used interchangeably. 2 These papers use CFA Institute (formerly Association for Investment and Management Research (AIMR)) score to measure quality of firm's disclosure. The score is composed by financial analysts and evaluates firm disclosure based on annual published information, quarterly and other published information, and communications with analysts. Ng (2008) examines other measures of information quality and finds that management forecast frequency is negatively associated with a firm's liquidity, while relevance of earnings and accrual quality are not significantly associated with a firm's liquidity. Jayaraman (2008) finds that the bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading are higher when public information is less informative, e.g. when the difference between the volatility of earnings and the volatility of cash flows is high. This relation holds both when earnings are smoother than cash flows and when earnings are more volatile than cash flows. Bhattacharya, Desai and Venkataraman (2010) find that accrual quality is positively associated with high frequency measure of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, and that firms with poor earnings quality experience a greater increase in information asymmetry around earnings announcements. Ascioglu, Hegde and McDermott (2005) find that auditor compensation, which has been found to be associated with disclosure quality, decreases liquidity for firms with weak corporate governance.
This paper extends the literature on the relation between liquidity and quality of financial information by examining long-term trends in liquidity for firms that make material mistakes in financial statements requiring a restatement. My research design has several advantages. As pointed out by Leuz and Wysocki (2008) "the existing literature
shows that measuring firms' financial reporting and disclosure activities is difficult and that commonly used proxies exhibit many problems." Instead of using a proxy for the quality of financial information, for restating firms one observes the period during which financial statements of a firm were of poor quality and knows the date when the market learns for the first time of the reporting issues. Second, a restating firm can be used as its own control, therefore eliminating the need to account for potential endogeneity of the firm's quality of financial information and liquidity.
I estimate Amihud's (2002) measure of illiquidity for restating firms over three periods: 1) a one-year period prior to the 1 st restated report (pre-error period); 2) the error period, which extends from the first misstated period to the date of restatement announcement; and 3) a three-year period after the restatement announcement (postrestatement period). To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to study changes in liquidity around restatement during these periods.
There are several reasons why examination of long-term liquidity around restatement announcement is important. First, studies of short-term changes in information asymmetry provide mixed results. Anderson and Yohn (2002) find that bidask spread increases surrounding restatements of revenue accounts. However, Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) do not confirm this result. Second, in its report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (CIFR) expressed concern regarding the time it takes for restating firms to disclose full impact of a restatement. 3 For many firms the time between restatement announcement and the filing of restated financial statements can take as long as one year. According to CIFR, during this period the firms report little financial information. CIFR claims that " [l] imited information seriously undermines the quality of investor analysis" (CIFR 2008, 79) . Examination of long-term changes in liquidity after restatement announcement will provide evidence regarding CIFR's concern. It will also provide empirical analysis of the belief of analysts and regulators that restatements cause long-term damage to credibility of firm's financial information (Wilson (2008) (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) ), making it important to know the full impact of a restatement, which is unlikely to be limited to the short-term window around its announcement. Using Fama McBeth (1973) type regression that corrects for cross-sectional correlation of residuals, I find that firms restating net income downward (income decreasing restatements) that are listed on NASDAQ experience an increase in illiquidity four months before restatement announcement that continues one year after restatement.
For income decreasing restating firms listed on NYSE or AMEX illiquidity increases one month after restatement and remains at elevated levels 12 months after restatement. An increase in illiquidity around restatement announcement for income decreasing restatements is economically important. For NASDAQ (NYSE/AMEX) firms, illiquidity three months before restatement increases 39% (55%), at restatement announcement -43% (42%) and one year after restatement -129% (80%) relative to pre-restatement level. I find no changes in illiquidity for firms that restate net income upward (income increasing restatements).
To summarize, this paper finds a substantial increase in information asymmetry in anticipation of income decreasing restatement announcement for firms listed on NASDAQ. For income decreasing restating firms listed on all exchanges information asymmetry increases after restatement and remains at elevated levels for at least one year.
Income increasing restatements do not affect information asymmetry of the firm. Overall, my results indicate a positive relation between quality of financial information and liquidity, supporting regulations that aim at improving the quality of financial information. This analysis is particularly timely given the focus of regulators on restatements and their concern that a firm's information environment is adversely affected by a restatement (Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting,
2008).
Cross-sectional analysis of the changes in illiquidity for income decreasing NASDAQ restatements reveals that restatements originated by an auditor result in lower changes in illiquidity both before and after a restatement. 4 Income decreasing NASDAQ restatements experience greater increase in illiquidity prior to restatement. Restatements that affect revenue recognition increase illiquidity more following restatement announcement for firms listed on all exchanges. Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater increase in illiquidity, while stocks with higher price experience smaller increase in illiquidity.
The paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, it extends prior research on the implications of the quality of financial information on liquidity.
However, I use an event study framework to establish poor quality of financial information as opposed to an imperfect proxy for information quality. Second, the paper contributes to the literature on restatements. Restatements have increased in the past decade, motivating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and several SEC initiatives, which in turn lowered the threshold for errors that required restatements. The full impact of a restatement can be better understood by considering its liquidity effect. This paper is the first to document that income decreasing restatements increase information asymmetry several months before and one year after restatement announcement; and that income increasing restatements do not affect information asymmetry. This paper is also the first to document cross-sectional differences in the changes of liquidity around restatement announcement. My analysis complements that of Palmrose, Richardson and Sholz (2004) , Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Badertscher and Burks (2010) by focusing on much longer windows both before and after restatement, documenting trends in liquidity for different types of restatements and performing cross-sectional analysis of changes in liquidity.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines hypotheses and reviews related literature. My measure of liquidity is discussed in Section 3. Section 4
describes the data and sample selection. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses and literature review
Firms that restate financial statements experience large shareholder losses at restatement announcement (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) , Akhigbe, Kudla, and Madura (2005) ). Large negative reaction to restatements is caused by the revelation that financial information of restating firms is worse than previously believed by the market. Poor quality of financial information can create information asymmetry between buyers and sellers of firm shares, which would result in reduced levels of liquidity of firm shares. This happens because market makers widen the bid-ask spread in order to protect themselves from better informed traders and to be compensated for bearing greater risk (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) , Amihud and Mendelson (1988) , Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) , Kyle (1985) , and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ).
5 Please see the next section for detailed literature review.
Several papers have examined changes in liquidity around restatement announcements. Anderson and Yohn (2002) study the change in bid-ask spreads during three days before announcement of the problem through three days after restatement filing and find that spreads increase for revenue recognition restatements. Controlling for other factors, they find that information asymmetry decreases upon restatement of restructuring items and increases upon revenue recognition restatements. However, Palmrose, Richardson and Sholz (2004) restatement, the period between restatement announcement and disclosure of the full impact of restatement (the disclosure period), and 90 days after disclosure. They find no difference in liquidity in these three periods for the full sample and find that fraudulent restatements result in lower liquidity during the disclosure period. In their sample, the disclosure period has a median of zero days for the full sample and 20 days for fraudulent restatements, which is a much shorter window than the one analyzed in this study. These studies' results are consistent with the notion that sophisticated investors are better able to see through financial statement errors and that their ability to detect poor earnings quality becomes greater as restatement date approaches. This may lead to a decrease in liquidity in the error period, which is defined as the period during which reported earnings and other financial information contains material errors (see Figure 1 ).
This leads to the first hypothesis tested in this paper.
6 Efendi, Kinney and Swanson (2004) (2007)). Restatement also increases the likelihood of litigation (Bardos, Golec and Harding (2010b) ) and adversely affects the cost of equity and loan contracting (Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) , Bardos and Mishra (2010) ). The adverse consequences of restatements can worsen information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. Whether or not the decrease in liquidity after restatement is temporary is an empirical question. If investors regain confidence in restating firms with time, the decrease in liquidity will be temporary, which would be consistent with Wilson's (2008) finding that the decline in information content of earnings response coefficient is temporary. I expect that liquidity decreases in post-restatement period; this leads to my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Liquidity of restating firms decreases in post-restatement period.
Measure of illiquidity
To Another advantage of using a measure calculated from daily data is that TAQ data is not available for many small firms, which constitute a significant portion of the restatement sample (Badertscher and Burks (2010)).
The Amihud (2002) price impact measure, ILLIQ, is defined as the absolute value of daily stock return, R, divided by the daily dollar trading volume, VOLD. It measures the trading volume needed to move the stock price.
I calculate daily ILLIQ for restating firm i for each day d as follows:
To minimize the influence of outliers on my results, I winsorize ILLIQ at 1% and 99% levels. I consider NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks separately because trading costs of NASDAQ-listed stocks are higher than NYSE/AMEX-listed stocks and because volume has different meaning for NASDAQ stocks (Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), Bessembinder (1999) and (2003) and Reinganum(1990) ).
Data
The restatement sample for the period January 1 Restatements that amend at least one 10-K (Annual) constitute the majority of my sample (see Table 1 
Results

Trends in liquidity of restating firms
To test my hypotheses, I plot monthly ILLIQ for three periods associated with the restatement timeline: pre-error, error and post-restatement. I first calculate monthly ILLIQ for each firm as an average of daily numbers and then find the average of monthly numbers for each month across all firms. The graph also shows announcement period illiquidity calculated as an average over days 0 and +1, where day 0 is the day of trends in illiquidity for income increasing restatements are different than for the full sample and for income decreasing restatements. Illiquidity exhibits much more volatility, which can potentially be attributed to smaller sample size. For NASDAQ firms, illiquidity increases one month before restatement, decreases at restatement announcement, and increases several months after restatement. For NYSE and AMEX firms, illiquidity decreases in months -2 and -1 relative to restatement and increases in months +10, +11 and +12.
<<< Insert Figure 2 here >>>
Most studies on restatements analyze a fixed window around either a restatement or a mistake. However, the problem with such approach is that one mixes pre-error, error and post-restatement periods. 10 For example, Desai, Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman (2006) examine short interest 24 months before and after restatement announcement.
However, the average length of the error period for NASDAQ restatements is only 1.5
years. Therefore, for many of these restatements 24 months window before restatement will include both the error and the pre-error period. To make my study comparable to Tables 3-5 present estimates for each restatement using daily data for one year before the error through one year after restatement. Separate analysis is performed for NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX firms. Table 3 shows the results for the full sample of restatements. I find that for NASDAQ restatements illiquidity increases starting in month -3 relative to restatement ( Another possibility for the difference in results is that earnings response coefficients are calculated using potentially biased analyst forecasts, while my measure of information asymmetry is calculated using market data. Table 3 here >>> Tables 4 and 5 show separate analysis for income decreasing and income increasing restatements, respectively. Results for income decreasing restatements are very similar to those for the full sample. For NASDAQ income decreasing restatements illiquidity increases four months before restatement through one year after the restatement (Table 4) . NYSE/AMEX income decreasing restatements exhibit decrease in illiquidity six months before restatement announcement. However, only coefficient on month -3 dummy is statistically significant at 10% level. For these firms illiquidity increases starting one month after restatement announcement. This increase persists for the entire year following a restatement. For income increasing restatements none of the changes in illiquidity around restatement are statistically significant (Table 5) . Tables 5 and 6 here >>>
<<< Insert
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Overall the results indicate that illiquidity increases prior to restatement and remains at elevated levels for many months after restatement announcement for income decreasing NASDAQ restatements, supporting hypotheses 1 and 2. For NYSE/AMEX firms illiquidity increases for eleven months starting one month after restatement announcement, supporting hypothesis 2. These results suggest that poor quality of financial information substantially increases information asymmetry among different groups of investors.
Cross-sectional analysis of changes in illiquidity of restating firms
In this section I examine cross-sectional variation in the changes of illiquidity around restatement announcement. Although any restatement may reveal lower quality of financial information, there are heterogeneous reasons for restatements and their impact on financial statements varies, potentially leading to heterogeneous implications for liquidity. I regress changes in illiquidity before restatement, at restatement announcement and after restatement on restatement characteristics and control variables.
First, I test whether changes in illiquidity are different for income decreasing and income increasing restatements by estimating the following model:
11 In results not shown I also separately analyze annual and quarterly restatements. Annual restatements are those that amend at least one 10-K. Quarterly restatements amend only 10-Qs (Quarterly). I find that the results for annual and quarterly restatements are very similar. (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) ) and longer loss of the information content of earnings (Wilson (2008) For each variable I calculate time series averages for the period of interest. Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for these variables. In Panel A these variables are calculated as time series averages for the window of (-3; +1) months relative to restatement. In Panel B these variables are calculated as time series averages for a one year window after restatement announcement. Log(Price) and Log(MarketCap) decrease after restatement for both NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX firms. Table 7 estimates all three models for illiquidity three months before restatement. , which equals the difference of the log of ILLIQ estimated three months before restatement and the log of ILLIQ estimated during the baseline period. The baseline period is a one year period prior to restatement ending six months before restatement announcement. Price, Std_return and MarketCap are estimated as time series averages for months -3 through month -1 relative to a restatement.
Specifically, the dependent variable is
<<< Insert Table 7, Panel A here >>>
Consistent with univariate analysis, for NASDAQ restating firms I find that the coefficient on Income decreasing is positive and significant at 5% in Models 1 and 3, suggesting that income decreasing restatements result in greater illiquidity (Table 7) .
Auditor dummy is negative and marginally significant (at 6% level), suggesting that illiquidity increases less prior to restatement when it is originated by auditor. Revenue, SEC and Annual dummies are not significant at explaining cross-sectional variation in illiquidity three months before restatement for NASDAQ restatements. I find a smaller increase in illiquidity for firms with higher stock prices, while larger firms experience greater increase in illiquidity. Table 7 , Panel B shows the analysis of changes in illiquidity three months before restatement for NYSE/AMEX restatements. I find that there is little cross-sectional variation in illiquidity three months before restatement for NYSE/AMEX restatements.
All restatement characteristics are insignificant in all models. The level of stock price is the only significant variable in all models. Coefficient on standard deviation of returns is positive and significant in Model 1. Table 7 , Panel B here >>> I also examine cross-sectional determinants of changes in restatement announcement illiquidity relative to the baseline period, but find that none of restatement characteristics are significant (results not tabulated), suggesting no cross-sectional variation in announcement period illiquidity.
<<< Insert
In Table 8 I report the analysis of cross-sectional variation in changes in illiquidity one year after restatement. The dependent variable is suggesting that revenue recognition restatements experience larger increase in illiquidity after restatement announcement. Coefficient on Auditor is negative and significant at 7% level in models 2 and 3. Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater increase in illiquidity as suggested by positive and significant coefficients on log(MarketCap) and log(Std_return). The coefficient on log(Price) is negative, indicating that stocks with higher price experience smaller increase in illiquidity. 
<<< Insert Table 8, Panel A here >>>
<<< Insert Table 8, Panel B here >>>
In alternative specifications instead of using Income decreasing dummy, I include NI_impact, which measures the impact of restatement on net income. 13 A restatement that has a greater impact on net income indicates poorer quality of previously reported financial statements, therefore potentially leading to greater increase in illiquidity. The estimated coefficient on this variable is not significant and the rest of the results are not affected. This suggests that it is the direction of the restatement and not the magnitude of its impact on net income that affects illiquidity before restatement.
Other characteristics of a restatement can capture its severity, some of which could be difficult to quantify. I account for such characteristics by including a two-day (0,+1) restatement announcement abnormal return, CAR01. CAR01 should be more negative for more serious restatements. Therefore, there should be a negative association between CAR01 and illiquidity. Since revenue recognition restatements have lower CAR01, I exclude Revenue dummy in specifications with CAR01 to avoid multicollinearity. The coefficient on CAR01 is not significant and the rest of the results are not affected.
Furthermore, I perform separate analysis for income decreasing and income increasing subsamples. For income decreasing restatements results are the same as for the full sample. For income increasing restatements, I find that the auditor dummy is no longer significant, while all control variables become significant in the analysis. 13 Results are not tabulated.
Overall, cross-sectional analysis suggests that three months before restatement illiquidity is higher for income decreasing NASDAQ restatements and that there is no cross-sectional variation for NYSE/AMEX restatements. Restatements initiated by auditor experience less significant increase in illiquidity up to three months before restatement and one year after restatement for NASDAQ firms. Restatements correcting revenue increase illiquidity more during a one year period following a restatement for firms listed on all exchanges. Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater increase in illiquidity while stocks with higher price experience smaller increase.
Conclusion
This paper studies long-term changes in Amihud (2002) Cross-sectional analysis of the changes in illiquidity for NASDAQ restatements reveals that restatements originated by auditor result in lower changes in illiquidity both before and after a restatement. Restatements that affect revenue recognition increase illiquidity more following restatement announcement for firms listed on all exchanges.
Larger firms with higher volatility of returns have greater increase in illiquidity while stocks with higher price experience smaller increase in illiquidity.
Overall my results indicate that restatements result in long-term increase in information assymetry. My findings support SEC regulators' and market analysts' contention that restatements cause damage to long-term credibility of financial statements. Figures 2.1-2.3 show monthly mean ILLIQ for the full sample, income decreasing and income increasing restatements, respectively. ILLIQ is Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity, calculated as the absolute value of daily stock return divided by the daily dollar trading volume. Income decreasing (income increasing) restatements are defined as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. Solid line labeled "Mistake" indicates the beginning of the error period. The error period is defined as the period, which extends from the first misstated period to the day of restatement announcement. Solid line labeled "Restatement" corresponds to the day of and the day after restatement announcement (days 0 and +1). All other points show ILLIQ estimated over a one month period. I assume that there are 21 trading days in one month. Revenue is a dummy variable that equals one if revenue account was restated. Auditor and SEC are dummy variables that equal one if restatements were initiated by auditor or SEC, respectively. CAR01 is a market model cumulative abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to a restatement announcement. Market model parameters are estimated over a 250 day period starting on day -46 relative to restatement using value weighted market index. NI_impact is the difference between restated net income (summed over all periods) and originally reported net income (summed over all periods), divided by total assets one year prior to restatement announcement. Lengths of the error period is the number of years spanned by the error period. Error period extends from the first misstated period to the date of restatement announcement. MarketCap is the market value of equity calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. Total Assets is the total assets as reported on the balance sheet. Leverage is the value of long term debt divided by total assets. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. MarketCap, Total Assets, Leverage and ROA are reported at year end prior to announcement. (1)). The model is estimated for each restatement using daily data for one year before mistake through one year after restatement. I include time dummies for each month 6 months before restatement and 12 months after restatement. I assume that there are 21 trading days in one month. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. , which equals the difference of the log of ILLIQ estimated for months -3 through -1 before restatement and the log of ILLIQ estimated during the baseline period. The baseline period is a one year period prior to restatement ending six months before restatement announcement. ILLIQ is Amihud's (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of daily stock return, divided by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). See Tables 1 and 6 for definition of explanatory variables. Price, Std_return and MarketCap are estimated during months (-3, -1) relative to restatement. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. , which equals the difference of the log of ILLIQ estimated one year after restatement and the log of ILLIQ estimated during the baseline period. The baseline period is a one year period prior to restatement ending six months before restatement announcement. ILLIQ is Amihud's (2002) measure of illiquidity and is defined as the absolute value of daily stock return, divided by the daily dollar trading volume (see equation (1)). See Tables 1 and 6 for definition of explanatory variables. Price, Std_return and MarketCap are estimated during months (+1, +12) relative to restatement. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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